

CIA FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN
FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND IN THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 22, 1975
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WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol Building, Senator John Sparkman [the chairman] presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Church, Symington, Pell, McGee, McGovern, Humphrey, Case, Scott, and Biden.

Also present: Mr. Holt of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, if you will take your seat we will get started.

As I understand it, it has been agreed that we will proceed in executive session.

Mr. Ambassador, we are glad to have you with us. Do you have a statement or do you want to make a statement?

TESTIMONY OF HON. RICHARD HELMS, AMBASSADOR TO IRAN, FORMER DIRECTOR, CIA

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. I was invited to come before this committee and I am here and delighted to answer any questions to the best of my ability.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

We do have a copy of your statement that was made before the Armed Services Committee. Each member has that before him.

We also have a statement here that Mr. Colby made before the Appropriations Committee.

MR. HELMS' TENURE AS HEAD OF CIA

How long were you head of the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. Six and a half years, sir, approximately.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a pretty long time.

Mr. HELMS. It looks as though it is turning out to be almost too long.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you there when the building was put up out there?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir. I joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 when it was established by Statute.

The CHAIRMAN. As a part of the National Security Act?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir; that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. My former colleague, Senator Hill, was on the Armed Services Committee. He was very much interested and took a leading part in the development of the National Security Act at the time.

COMMITTEE'S CONCERN

As I conceive it, the Foreign Relations Committee is directly concerned with foreign aspects of the CIA. For my part I do not think the committee should be especially concerned, except individually, of course, as citizens of the country, with domestic operations.

The Armed Services Committee was given, I believe, oversight under the Security Act over the CIA. Is that not right?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And they have exercised that oversight.

There is a resolution that is to be voted on, I believe, Monday to set up a select committee to go into the CIA matters. Of course, they would cover everything, and I am quite certain that some such resolution will be adopted.

COMMITTEE ATTENTION TO CIA OPERATIONS RESULTING FROM CHILEAN SITUATION

Our attention was brought to CIA operations as a result of our checking into the situation in Chile several years ago.

Were you head of CIA at that time?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Actually, Senator Church is the one who went into that more fully than anybody else. He was studying the ITT operation in Chile at that time and that is when we became involved with all of this.

At the time that we held the hearings on the ITT operations in Chile, and the CIA came up, we did not spend a great deal of time on the CIA side of the picture. We did say at that time, however, that we would at a future time hold hearings on the CIA. Actually, that accounts for the present session.

We did not anticipate at that time that there was going to be all of this hullabaloo that has developed over the last few months with reference to CIA.

I mentioned Chile as being the thing that really pinpointed our attention.

Since that time I have heard that there have been somewhat similar instances in other countries. I have nothing definite on them. I have heard the names of some of the countries, but I have no information with regard to that.

HOW CIA OPERATED IN ITS FOREIGN ACTIVITIES

Would you explain to us just how the CIA operated in its foreign activities?

Ambassador HELMS. Well, Mr. Chairman, the Agency as you know has been put under the National Security Council. In other words, it reports to the National Security Council which is effectively the President. The National Security Council in turn, in addition to what is stated in the National Security Act of 1974, has given the Agency two additional charters. One makes the Agency responsible for con-

ducting intelligence collection and counterintelligence collection overseas, the other is a charter which gives the Agency responsibility for various types of what is referred to technically as covert actions, covert operations overseas. And encompassed in covert operations are covert political activities, black propaganda, military activities and paramilitary activities and a variety of things of this kind.

I would like to for a moment digress to say that I understand that this committee now under the new amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act will be responsible for monitoring various covert actions of the Agency and it might be helpful in that connection if the present Director were to show you the actual piece of paper, the National Security Council directive to which I refer, which is a top secret document, but which is the document and the charge under which these activities are carried out, because I do think that the authority for these things ought to be made clear, that this isn't something that certainly when I was Director of the Agency that we just did on our own, we had a clearance mechanism, we had an approval mechanism when we were asked to perform one of these actions or originated the idea ourselves, there was a National Security Council Committee called the 40 Committee to which we reported and which in turn either approved or disapproved whatever the proposal was. So that these actions throughout recent years have to the best of my knowledge been approved by other authorities in the U.S. Government, the White House, State Department, Defense Department and so forth.

Is that responsive to your question, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

SEPTEMBER 4, 1970, CHILEAN RESIDENTIAL ELECTION

I have been reading the part of our transcript of your confirmation hearing which refers to the Chilean situation. You said that no money was used under your direction to influence that election.

Ambassador HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I don't recollect exactly what the language of Senator Symington's question was. My recollection of what he asked me at that time was whether we had given money to the political opponents of President Allende and I believe that I replied that we had not.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Ambassador HELMS. I want to explain because there seems to have been some question about this response.

I thought at the time that Senator Symington was asking me a question to get a certain kind of information and that was this. That I had assumed that Senator Symington knew that in 1964, at the request of the White House, the CIA had given money to a political candidate [deleted] in Chile, in that election, that was [deleted] and we had given a considerable sum of money, I mean at least \$2 or \$3 million, as best I recall it. I am not sure whether it is that figure or slightly larger. Please don't hold me to that. But at least a significant sum of money was given to him in an effort to help him win the election against two other opponents who at that time were [deleted] and a third man, my mind is a little rusty on, [deleted] or something in 1964.

Mr. HOLT. In 1964 [deleted].

Ambassador HELMS. Does that conform with your recollection?

Mr. HOLT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Here you use the name of Alessandri and another fellow named Tomic.

Senator CASE. That was in 1970.

Ambassador HELMS. What are you reading from?

The CHAIRMAN. I am reading from a committee memorandum which covers the questions presented to you when you were up for confirmation.

Ambassador HELMS. Well, sir, I just read the record yesterday when I was up for confirmation and I don't recall anyone mentioning Mr. Alessandri.

I have a printed record here of what I understand were my confirmation hearings.

Am I wrong about this?

The CHAIRMAN. No; the one about Alessandri, I think, came up in a hearing before Senator Church's multinational subcommittee.

Ambassador HELMS. I see. I have not seen that transcript. Would you be so kind as to read the portions of it because—

The CHAIRMAN. At your confirmation hearing, Senator Symington asked:

Did you try in the Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow the Government of Chile?

Your answer was "No, sir."

Senator Symington asked:

Did you have any money passed to the opponents of Allende?

You said "No, sir."

So that the stories that you were involved in that are wrong entirely.

That is Senator Symington.

You answered:

Yes, sir. I said to Senator Fulbright many months ago, that if the agency had really gotten in behind the other candidates and spent a lot of money and so forth, the election might have come out differently.

That is the extent of what we have in the questioning of Senator Symington.

1970 CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

In order that we get the whole thing tied together, in 1973 before Senator Church's Multinational Corporations Subcommittee, Senator Church said:

Now, following the election, and up to the time that the Congress of Chile cast its vote installing Allende as the new President, did the CIA attempt in any way to influence that vote?

You asked, "Which vote?"

"Senator CHURCH. The vote of the Congress."

You answered, "No sir."

A few pages later, in the same transcript, the same subject recurs. Senator Church asked you:

Did the 40 Committee approve the commitment of funds for use in Chile for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Chilean Presidential election of September 4, 1970?

You say, "Which funds are these?"

"Senator CHURCH. 'Any funds.' "

You say:

Well, the 40 Committee I know approved some funds for activities in Chile but that they were directed against the influence of the election, put that way, is not my recollection of it.

"Senator CHURCH. 'What were the funds used for?'"

You say, "I frankly don't remember very precisely any more."

Then later you said:

. . . there seems to be a feeling that the Agency put money into the political process, in other words, to back other, the other candidates in this election to defeat Allende, and this is about the only way I know that you influence elections. Maybe there are other ways, but I simply wanted to clear up the point that we did not back Alessandri, I forget the name of the other fellow, Tomic. We put no money in their campaign whatever and this has been haunting me that there seems to be a sensation that in saying we had not done this, that I have not been leveling. I mean we did not do it.

That is all I care to read. I thought I would do that in order that we could get started.

May I call on Senator Symington,

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I will swing to Senator Case.

IMPRESSION WE WERE NOT DOING ANYTHING TO INFLUENCE CHILEAN POLITICS

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ambassador, briefly, to follow up your lead on Chile. I must confess I am not now trying to put your statements against other people's statements made at different times, but the general impression we got both in your confirmation hearing and in the Multinational Subcommittee hearing, and not only from you but from Meyer, was that we were not doing anything to influence Chilean politics. This was obviously not true. Maybe we all should have known this as a matter of general knowledge.

How come we keep getting this impression in the public record? I wish you would try and help.

MR. HELM'S FEBRUARY 1, 1973, TESTIMONY CONCERNING CHILE

Mr. HELMS. I would like to go back just a moment, because Senator Church has come back, to make it a little bit easier.

May I deal first with the testimony when I was up for confirmation, which was on February 7, I believe, in this printed record?

When Senator Symington asked me that question, or those two questions, I really thought that he and I were tracking, that he recalled that in 1964, at the request of the White House, the CIA had backed [deleted] in the election of 1964. There were two other candidates I believe at that time.

One of them was [deleted] and the other—Mr. Holt has helped me in my memory—a gentleman named [deleted].

When Senator Symington asked me this question, I thought that he was anxious to find out whether or not we had put money into Alessandri to make campaigns against Allende; in other words, the political opponents of President Allende, and we had not.

He also asked me a question there, and I thought that when I answered this, perhaps I should have answered it in a much more extensive way. May I say, right here and now, that I think I made one mistake in that testimony, maybe it is a serious mistake, but I should have probably asked either to go off the record or to have asked to discuss this matter in some other forum, because you will recall at that time Allende's government was in power in Chile and we did not need any more diplomatic incidents or any more difficulties than the United States and Chile already were having by 1973 when I testified.

As far as the earlier statement is concerned, whether the agency tried to overthrow the Government of Chile, I answered "No." I believe that is true. If it has been alleged differently by someone else, I would appreciate having it.

I know that the Nixon administration wanted it overthrown but there was no way to do it that anybody knew of and any probes that were made in Chile to ascertain whether there was any force there that was likely to bring this about produced no evidence that there was any such force.

The Agency, therefore, never tried. I believe that is true.

By the testimony I wish you gentlemen would help me because I have a sensation here sometimes I am walking onto a bog, that maybe somebody has come up and said something else, which makes it seem as though I am not being forthright.

Now the money, as I understand it, that went into the Chile operation went into civic action groups, supporting newspapers, radios, and so forth, in order to keep alive the [deleted] and the sort of Nationalist side of the Chilean spectrum, social spectrum. I did not realize that went into political parties, I did not think that it had, at least it was my understanding at the time. If somebody has said something else, I am prepared to stand corrected.

I want to be very responsive to Senator Case because I do not want there to be any question here any longer.

IMPORTANCE OF COMMITTEE'S GOOD OPINION

May I just disgress to say that the good opinion of this committee is very important to me, it always had been when I was Director and it is important to me this day.

I have been in the Government for 32 years. When you have been in Government that long, you get a pension when you are finished, and the only thing you have left is your reputation. If I do not have my reputation left when I leave the Government, I have lost 32 years effectively and I really am not a bit interested in seeing that happen.

So if the committee or Senator Case feels that you were deliberately misled here, I can only plead that I had no intention of lying, I had no intention of deliberately misleading this committee, and it is altogether possible that, as I was answering these questions, I was assuming a fund of knowledge on the part of you gentlemen which possibly you did not have.

Senator CASE. You must never assume that.

Really, that sounds a little bit like saying that we never asked the right questions.

Mr. HELMS. I am up against that problem.

Senator CASE. You are.

Mr. HELMS. It seems to me something Senator Fulbright once said to me, and I can only say that when it comes to here today, I will answer any possible questions in the Department that you want. If I have been guilty in the past of not having gone the whole way, all right, but at least—

Senator CASE. Since Chile is Senator Church's particular concern, I would like, Mr. Chairman, to yield to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

COMMITTEE'S PURPOSE

Let me interject right here, Mr. Helms, that I do not want you to feel that this committee is trying to get you or trying to embarrass you or anything like that. I want to say that I have known you throughout the years. I knew you when you were head of CIA; I never had any dealings with you, I knew you. I respected your leadership, and I always felt that you tried to do a good job.

You have read all of these statements in the press?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I felt, and I am sure the members of this committee felt, that so far as covert actions in foreign countries were concerned, we more or less had an obligation to check into it. That is all we are trying to do. It is not to prosecute or persecute you.

Of course, you have had a long distinguished service in the Government and I think I can assure you that everyone on this committee wants to see you reach that time of retirement with your honor, and your reputation, intact and your head high.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. As long as my name has been mentioned in the testimony, may I make a short statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

SUBJECT OF SENATOR SYMINGTON'S FEBRUARY 7, 1973, QUESTIONING

Senator SYMINGTON. When I was asking the question, I was not thinking about 1964 or any previous situation. That does not surprise me because I knew little about the CIA.

When I asked the question I was thinking of the Allende government, not of something that happened 6, 7, or 8 years ago.

I had been approached by people before about copper interests in Chile, but had not the faintest idea I was asking whether money had been given to Chile many years before.

Interest had to do primarily with the copper setup, so I fully sympathize with the witness when he says he thought my questioning had to do with what we had done to the Allende government in effort to bring it down.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church?

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HARRINGTON LETTER'S ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING CIA ACTIVITY

What I would like to do, Mr. Ambassador, is to set out first of all, so that there are no traps or blind alleys in this, what we now have heard about the CIA activity in Chile, and I would like to refer to

the letter that the press got hold of, the Harrington letter. It was first revealed in "The New York Times," I think.

Since that time, we have checked the allegations in this letter against testimony that Mr. Colby subsequently gave, that is, subsequent to your testimony.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH. And, insofar as I can tell in making the comparison, although the Colby testimony was not as specific in all particulars as the allegations in the letter, the Colby testimony substantially confirmed these allegations. That is my impression of the Colby testimony.

In general, the letter alleges that the Nixon administration authorized more than \$8 million for covert activities by the CIA in Chile between 1970 and 1973. The purpose of these covert activities was said to be an effort to make it impossible for President Salvador Allende Gossens to govern; and second, that all of these activities were specifically authorized by the Forty Committee, chaired by Secretary of State Kissinger, which authorizes such clandestine activities.

Again, according to the letter, the goal of these activities was to destabilize, which is the term that the letter uses, the Allende government; and further, it was considered a test of using heavy cash payments to bring down the government, viewed as antagonistic to the United States.

Specifically, the forty Committee, chaired by Kissinger, is charged with having authorized the following CIA activities and expenditures.

First. In 1969, \$500,000 was expended to fund individuals who could be nurtured to keep the anti-Allende forces active and intact.

Second. During the 1970 election, \$500,000 was given to opposition party personnel, and, third, that after the September 4, 1970 popular election, \$350,000 was authorized to bribe the Chilean Congress as part of a scheme to overturn the results of the election in which Allende gained a plurality, although that plan was later evaluated as unworkable.

There are some other specifics. Let's take these first in order.

USE OF FUNDS AUTHORIZED IN 1969 AND 1970

Going back to your testimony on February 7, 1973, when Senator Symington asked, "Did you have any money passed to the opponents of Allende?" your answer was, "No, sir."

Now, first of all, were these sums that I have referred to authorized in 1969 for use prior to the election and during the election of 1970? What were they used for and how can these charges in the letter be reconciled with your answer to the question that Senator Symington put to you?

Ambassador HELMS. I understood Senator Symington to have asked me if we had given money to Mr. Allende's opponents, which were two, a man named Alessandri and a man named Tomic.

Senator McGEE. You mean his actual opponents, not those opposing him?

Ambassador HELMS. I understood the question to mean that because in a previous election I had in mind we had actually given the money to the candidates.

Senator McGEE. Senator Church; if you will yield on that, that seems to me an area where everybody has gotten off on a separate track.

Ambassador HELMS. I obviously did.

Senator CHURCH. To confirm what did in fact happen, going back to the specifics, in 1969, was \$500,000 expended to fund individuals who could be nurtured to keep anti-Allende forces active and intact?

Could you tell us what the money was used for—whether this characterization is a fair one?

Ambassador HELMS. I cannot, I am sorry; at this late date, I don't recall any more; and I didn't realize that this testimony was going to be before us today, so I have not reviewed it before. I am hearing it now for the first time, and I am not going to be in the position of misleading you; and whatever the Agency records show as against maybe Congressman Harrington's record, I am quite prepared to accept, and they can be put in the record at this time.

Senator CHURCH. May I ask during the 1970 election, maybe part of this you can recall—

Ambassador HELMS. I will do my best.

Senator CHURCH [continuing]. During the 1970 election, the charge is made that \$500,000 was given to opposition party personnel. Now, we have not been told that it was given directly to Alessandri or to the other opponent.

Ambassador HELMS. Senator Church, my recollection; and that is only to the best of my recollection, I didn't think this was being given to political parties, I thought it was being given to civic action groups. That was my recollection at that time. Whether these civic action or social groups might, by perfectly normal extrapolations, be tied to certain political parties, it may well be, but it was not my impression at the time that these were actually going into people in the political apparatus, as we would have it in this country in the Democratic or Republican Parties.

ALLEGED PLAN TO BRIBE CHILEAN CONGRESS

Senator CHURCH. The third of these charges is that after the September 4, 1970, popular election, \$350,000 was authorized to bribe the Chilean Congress, as part of a scheme to overturn the result of the election in which Allende gained a plurality, although that plan was later evaluated as unworkable.

Now, what do you know about that proposition?

Ambassador HELMS. Well, as I say again, my recollection is not very clear. I know that there was a lot of planning going on about various ways, if possible, to upset the result; in other words, to have a vote in the Assembly when it came down to the two candidates that had won, that would be against Allende, that there was planning and work and thought given to how one might upset that, I think there is no doubt.

Senator CHURCH. Do you recall whether or not that planning was set aside, whether a finding was made that such plans were unworkable?

Ambassador HELMS. I think so.

Senator CHURCH. Did it go beyond the planning stage?

Ambassador HELMS. I think so, because as I think back to that period, there was obviously a lot of pressure from the Administration to see if something could be done about this, but I believe when it

was examined, it was found it was quite unworkable, Allende had this all wrapped up, it was put in the bag, and there was nothing that was going to change it.

Senator CHURCH. Do you recall at this time whether or not any bribes were attempted?

Ambassador HELMS. That I do not remember.

May I say, Senator, I am not trying to mislead you. Maybe there were.

Senator CHURCH. I understand. I accept the fact that these details are difficult to remember.

OBTAINING INFORMATION CONCERNING HARRINGTON CHARGES FROM
CIA SUGGESTED

Ambassador HELMS. May I say, sir, in an effort to put my memory in perspective at this particular time, there were a lot of other things going on, and I was not as intimately involved in these things as perhaps I might have been at any time in history, but I would like to invite you, because I realize the Foreign Relations Committee is going to have a key role now in all of these covert actions, to actually get somebody to come up here with the files and tell you very specifically what happened rather than what Congressman Harrington thinks happened.

Senator CHURCH. I was just about to make this proposal to the chairman, that following our hearing here, Mr. Chairman, we do obtain for our own record the full information from the CIA with respect to the particulars of these charges, so that we have directly from the Agency all of the facts concerning the charges, as I recognize you may not be able to recall particulars.

Senator HUMPHREY. You want all of the covert activities against all countries?

Senator CHURCH. No.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let me make it clear we are speaking now only with regard to the letter and the specific charges that have been made, a letter that was made public and became really the cause of this hearing today.

The reason I bring this up is that we do have general authority over covert activities.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

POLICY QUESTION CONCERNING OBTAINING CIA INFORMATION

Senator HUMPHREY. I have very mixed feelings about this. I just put a note down here, "Do we want the CIA to tell us what they have been doing in some other countries?" because I think some of these things are a good deal cheaper than the Bay of Pigs. There are so many countries in which these covert activities take place that I think there is a real general policy question whether we ought to have them or not. If we do, how much do we want to know about them, and whom are we going to trust with the information?

I went over to the State Department Saturday and sat down with only the Secretary of State, and I saw it all in the paper the next morning. There is no way you can talk to anybody about anything that they won't report it, except perhaps that you love your mother.

The CHAIRMAN. Just the two of you talking?

Senator HUMPHREY. Just two of us.

The CHAIRMAN. Which one of you leaked it?

Senator HUMPHREY. I do not know which one, but I am telling you what happened. The memorandum to a lady who had set up the meeting had been given to the New York Times. On the day after I left, the New York Times editor called me up and said he wanted to read me a memorandum which precipitated my meeting over there, about which I knew nothing. I did not even know there was a memo.

I get back again to what is happening in Chile. I have to go now. I am trying to get jobs for 400 people in Minnesota today. That is a great deal more important to me right now than Chile.

Senator SCOTT. You better take that back unless you want it in the Times.

Senator HUMPHREY. I will leave it. I hope it gets printed because I have two towns out home, one with 300 people laid off and one with 270. That is 570 people with no jobs this morning, and I am really in trouble.

Let me say that I do think that we have a problem here. I am interested in getting this Chile question cleared up, but I would be interested to find out what we have done in other countries.

I have to say these things because to me I think there is a real policy question here of how far we go and what we do in terms of record.

Senator CHURCH. I agree that is one policy question we have to resolve in light of the provisions of the new law.

If it is reassuring at all, I had lunch privately with the Secretary yesterday.

Senator HUMPHREY. I saw you go out.

Senator CHURCH. So far I have not seen anything in the New York Times about it. [Laughter.]

Senator HUMPHREY. But I do think, if I may say, that we are fastened on the Chile question because it got to be a part of the general testimony but, interestingly enough to me, while we are concerned about Chile, and I am, I have yet to hear anybody really examining what we did in other places. And do not think we did not do a lot.

I am just worried about the trend we are following.

NEED FOR GUIDELINES IN OBTAINING CIA INFORMATION

Senator CHURCH. I would hope that if a select committee is chosen and approved by the Senate, some guidelines can be developed for the future with respect to covert operations because there is, I would suggest, a difference between an elected government and a government imposed by force of arms.

Senator HUMPHREY. Absolutely.

Senator SCOTT. And a difference between invasion, too, and action short of invasion.

Senator CHURCH. There are all kinds of differences, but this makes the need for some guidelines all the more important.

May I get back to the question of Chile?

NOT DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN EVENTS QUESTIONED

Senator McGEE. May I inject one thought. These things most of us went through here, and the testimony that was presented, really were triggered by two things: Senator Church's very telling ITT

hearings and the disclosures which began to unfold, and, secondly, the overthrow of the Allende government, the military coup, in September 1973.

Things, which happened at quite different times historically, often get merged. As I read the testimony again, questions that were provoked by events of an earlier time led to answers that were then directed at the coup which had just occurred. I generally feel now, more so than before as I reread this, that is where the double tracking occurred.

When the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee had the CIA, Ambassador Davis, Mr. Kubisch and the Secretary of State here, we came back to this again and again. They laid out very candidly for us in most instances what had transpired in the election of 1964 and how much it must have been toned down by 1970, even though there was still participation. But by the time of the coup, which is what brought all of this to a very emotional head, there had been nothing in Harrington's letter or letters, or his memo or in the subsequent memos, that contradicted the Colby assessment given before our subcommittee after the coup, in November of 1973, namely: The CIA was not involved in any direct way with the coup; they had been warned that it was coming, once a week for several months. There was money being circulated but not in the dimension as before, because after the ITT hearings everybody learned a lot of lessons. The commitment was on a very modest scale, which was to keep opposition voices alive through newspapers or radio stations or individuals who were doing this sort of thing. But at no time was money given to the truckers' strike. No money was given to any group or encouragement to any group to overthrow the government. It was all pitched toward the 1976 election.

That is quite a different policy goal than triggering the defeat of Allende, or even the bribing question at the time that Allende and his opponent were to be voted on by the congress, which is very serious. That is why I think in hindsight it is awfully important, for me at least, to sort out which were the disastrous things that were undertaken earlier from which, hopefully, all have learned. Those ought to be included in the ultimate guidelines as ways not to do it, but we have been guilty of not differentiating between the events and kind of generalizing on them, particularly Congressman Harrington.

COMMITTEE KNOWLEDGE OF COVERT ACTIVITY

The CHAIRMAN. May I interject a thought at this point?

I agree with what Senator McGee has said and I have said time and again that we ought to establish guidelines. I think we must be very careful to avoid the idea that covert activity in foreign countries is something totally unknown to us. We have known of it.

Senator McGEE. Or unwarranted.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been told about it from time to time.

I believe we recognize the necessity still of having covert actions in foreign countries, but I think Senator McGee touches it properly when he says there ought to be guidelines. We ought not to run wild with them, but, nevertheless, I do not think we can just shake our heads and say, "The very idea of covert action in that country."

Senator CHURCH. I appreciate what you have said, and of course, we have known in the past in a general way of covert activities by the

CIA. The Chilean incident was not the first revelation of this kind but we had testimony on it—with apparent discrepancies—and that is what I am trying to get at.

PLAN TO BRIBE CHILEAN CONGRESS

Now, I just questioned you, to pick up the track again, Mr. Ambassador, about what happened after the popular election in September of 1970, when, according to our information, \$350,000 was authorized to bribe the Chilean Congress as part of a scheme to overturn the results of the election, and it was later judged that such a plan was unworkable, and, you have testified that, as I understand your answer, that though you can't recall all of the particulars, that some attention was given to such a scheme, at least.

Isn't that correct?

Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH. That being the case, let me refer to a question that I asked you on March 6, 1973, during the executive session of the Multinational Corporation, Subcommittee. I asked at that time, I quote from the record, "Now, following the election"—we were discussing the Chilean election—"and up to the time that the Congress of Chile cast its vote installing Allende as the new President, did the CIA attempt in any way to influence that vote?"

And you responded "Which vote?" And I said "the vote of the Congress." And you said, "No, sir."

Now do you see any discrepancy in your answer to my question at that time with what you have just told us?

Ambassador HELMS. Sir, I think that what is involved here is this. That as best I recall it thought was given to trying to upset this election but there was no way found to do it. In other words, when the situation was calculated and observed it was found that this was in the bag, that the money would certainly not get the votes necessary to overturn the election.

I realize, sir, even in light of that that my answer was narrow, but I would like to say something here.

I didn't come into the Multinational Committee hearing to mislead you, but I have had as Director, or did have as Director in 6½ years a lot of problems, and one of the principal problems was who in the Congress was really to divulge all of the details of covert operations to, and I must say this has given me a great deal of difficulty over the years and I just want to say once a real oversight committee is set up in the Congress it will make a great difference to any future Director because many times I have wanted to be able to go to somebody and say what do you think.

Senator CHURCH. I can appreciate that.

Ambassador HELMS. I must say this was very difficult for me.

Senator CHURCH. I can appreciate that. That has been an ambiguity which must have been difficult for every CIA Director.

Ambassador HELMS. It has been.

Senator CHURCH. And an ambiguity that should be cleared up.

Ambassador HELMS. If I was less than forthcoming it wasn't because I was being bloody minded, it was simply because I was trying to stay within what I thought was the congressional guidelines.

Senator CHURCH. I see.

POSSIBILITY OF OBLIGATION TO MISLEAD CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

Senator McGOVERN. Mr. Helms, one thing that I think bears on this whole subject, including the line of questioning that Senator Church has developed, is something that has bothered me. Some years ago, an administration official was quoted publicly as saying he thought there are times when Government officials had a patriotic obligation to lie.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think Sylvester was his name.

Senator CASE. I thought it was Allen Dulles.

Senator McGOVERN. Maybe they both did.

Senator CASE. We are not joking at all and I am not saying that these people don't have the most honorable intentions in everything they do, including lying.

Senator McGOVERN. What I wanted to ask Ambassador Helms is this: Is it possible that a person, either the Director of CIA or someone high in the Agency, would feel that he had either a right, maybe an obligation, on certain occasions, to mislead congressional committees?

Is there a rationalization that you might go through—"Well, with the national interest in mind I am going to deliberately give a misleading answer on this, not because I want to be a liar but because I am concerned about the security of the country and, therefore, I am not going to give a truthful answer?"

Ambassador HELMS. Well, Senator McGovern, I could understand something like that going through any Director's mind. I would like to say the way I guided myself during the 6½ years I was Director, I made up my mind that I wasn't going to lie to any congressional committees, that I was going to be as forthcoming as I thought I could under the circumstances existing at the hearing, whether I was before an oversight committee or someplace else, and I must say I always had the alternative of going to the Senator privately and say please will you pull back on that, we are getting into a very sensitive area, and I realize against that background that these discrepancies or misinterpretations and so forth, maybe what I should have done at the time was to go to Senator Church's office and sit down with him and go over these things in a much more extensive way simply so he would know where the pitfalls were. But at that time the Allende government was still in power. I felt obliged to keep some of this stuff, in other words, not volunteer a good deal of information because my oversight committee wanted to hear it. I would have volunteered it, but my understanding had been that that was where I was going to give all of the covert information. I don't want to seek refuge and say I lied in the national security interest. I didn't run into any situation where I thought that was required.

COVER STORY FOR CIA COVERT OPERATION

Senator CHURCH. I don't know whether there is any basis of truth in it or not, but I have heard, when a covert operation is launched by the CIA, that, as a part of the planning for the execution of the operation, a cover story is agreed upon to be used in connection with any questions that might arise, and that the cover story is to apply wherever necessary, including its use in connection with questions that may be raised by congressional committees.

Is there any truth to that?

Ambassador HELMS. Well, not that I am aware of, sir, particularly with respect to congressional committees. Obviously a cover story, there is the press to take care of, public inquiries in foreign countries and so forth, but I don't recall any time my coming to a congressional committee and giving a cover story and hiding what was behind it. If anybody knows of one I would be glad to have them help me with my memory. I don't recall any because this was not my intention.

ALLEGED CIA SPYING ON CONGRESSMEN

One of the allegations here recently has been that the CIA spied on Congressmen. Nothing could be farther from the truth. I think even if my mind is limited, when I came to be Director after all these years in Government it would have occurred to me that the last thing in the world that any agency would need, let alone the CIA, was to keep files on, keep dossiers on or surveil Congressmen. They are duly elected representatives of the U.S. public, there is no reason to do it. It was not the CIA function in any event, and I promise you that as far as I was aware none were ever kept and I never permitted anybody to raise a finger.

ALLEGED SURVEILLANCE OF SENATOR GOLDWATER'S CAMPAIGN

There is an allegation that has been made that Senator Goldwater's campaign, I think it was in 1964, was surveilled by the CIA. I simply do not believe it. I simply do not believe it. I would want the witness to come and sit right opposite me and tell me the precise occasions and dates and so forth of any such event, because if I had ever heard of such a thing I wouldn't have permitted it for a minute.

I think you have to have a very limited intelligence to think there was anything to be gained by that kind of activity. I hope I am not that limited.

POSSIBILITY OF CIA'S BEING TURNED TO AFTER MR. HELMS LEFT

Senator McGEE. Would it be conceivable that Ehrlichman or Haldeman turned to the CIA after you left, because they couldn't get any cooperation from the FBI. Isn't that one of the stories they are telling us now? Is it conceivable that that could happen, but not in your day?

Ambassador HELMS. Well, even in my day when this constantly came up I want to say, sir, I resisted, simply didn't comply. There are agencies which I will if you like, cover them in a minute, maybe there are semantical differences, but I would like to explain a little bit what this turmoil is all about because I think we have got a question here of the definition of terms what people are talking about.

MR. HELMS' TESTIMONY OF FEBRUARY 7, 1973

Ever since February 7 there has been hanging in the record the intimation that I didn't tell the truth to Senator Case. When I came back on May 21 I thought I was going to get that cleared up. I have just read the record and it ran out at the end, for some reason we didn't get back on the thing. I don't know whether Senator Case

thinks I misled him intentionally and has thought that for 2 years or not. I hope not. I hope he knows me better than that. But in any event I will be glad to discuss it with you.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I would like it very much. What I said before in the general colloquy about this Agency and about covert operations and standards and honesty, I believe is this: I don't know how you can have a covert operation that is not covert, and people who go into it, people obviously with the greatest distinction, you and Allen and others, take this on as part of the responsibility that you have. and I accept that. When you say that you lied or didn't tell the truth—I have forgotten exactly what the words were—I meant that in accordance with ordinary standards, you were not as forthcoming as it seems to me ordinary people would think they should be. I do feel that that is true.

AUGUST 5, 1970, HUSTON MEMORANDUM TO HALDEMAN

In connection with this business of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence and the Huston proposal, with which I am sure you are very familiar, Hoover resisted the suggestion that was made at the end of that report, saying the FBI is opposed to the creation of a permanent committee for the purpose of providing evaluations of domestic intelligence but that the FBI would approve providing periodic domestic intelligence estimates.

Later on Huston adverted to this matter and in a memorandum, for example, objected to accepting Hoover's mandate. He said, "All of us are going to look damn silly" in the minds of several people, including Helms—you are mentioned here exactly—if we lie down and let Hoover in effect run over us in this matter.

Ambassador HELMS. Sir, excuse me—

Senator CASE. These are his exact words:

If he gets his way, it is going to look like he is more powerful than the President. He had his say in the footnotes and RN decided against him.

That should close the matter and I can't understand why the AG is a party in reopening it. All of us are going to look damn silly in the eyes of Helms, Gayler, Bennett and the military chiefs if Hoover can unilaterally reverse a Presidential decision based on a report that many people worked their asses off to prepare and which, on the merits, was a first-rate objective job.

This is a memorandum which Huston gave to Haldeman on August 5, 1970.

Ambassador HELMS. What are you reading from, I am sorry?

Senator CASE. This is part of the record of the Senate Watergate Committee.

Ambassador HELMS. I see.

Senator CASE. This kind of thing indicating that CIA was involved with the preparation of this report and these proposals which are contained in it, to which, for whatever reasons, Edgar Hoover objected.

JULY 1970, HUSTON MEMORANDUM TO HALDEMAN

Then there is a comment that came to my attention recently through an article by Walter Pincus in the New Republic, too, a statement by Huston in a memorandum in July 1970, to Haldeman, saying, a "working group of the top domestic intelligence officials of the FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA, and each of the military services, met

regularly throughout June to discuss the problems outlined by the President, and to draft the attached report. The discussions were frank and the quality of work first rate."

That was the first paragraph of the first section called "Background." The second section is called, "Mr. Hoover," and it goes on, this way: "I went into this exercise fearful CIA would refuse to cooperate. In fact Dick Helms—Director of Central Intelligence—was most cooperative and helpful, and the only stumbling block was Mr. Hoover."

MR. HELM'S FEBRUARY 7, 1973, TESTIMONY CONCERNING ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

There are a couple of other things, but this I put against the questions and answers we had in our confirmation hearing, I guess it was on the 7th of February 1973, in which I said to you:

It has been called to my attention that in 1969 or 1970 the White House asked that all intelligence agencies join in the effort to learn as much as they could about the antiwar movement and during this period U.S. Army Intelligence became involved and kept files on U.S. citizens. Do you know anything about any activity on the part of CIA in that connection? Was it asked to be involved?

You are recorded as replying:

I don't recall whether we were asked, but we were not involved because it seems to me that was a clear violation of what our charter was.

I said:

What do you do in a case like that?

You answered:

I would simple go to explain to the President this didn't seem to me to be advisable.

I commented:

That would end it?

And you said:

Well, I think so, normally.

I said:

OK.

I was turned off on inquiring further about the activity of the CIA. It does seem to me when you were involved in preparation of a report and plans, with action suggested, that your answer to me was disingenuous at least.

Ambassador HELMS. May I reply?

Senator CASE. I wish you would. Really again there is no malice at all in this.

Senator SCOTT. May I make a request that Mr. Helms be allowed to reply without a spate of interruption. In all fairness to him, I want him to have an opportunity to answer.

Senator CASE. I agree with you fully.

Senator SCOTT. I have not said anything yet, but I do want answers as well as questions.

Mr. HELMS. When I answered your question, I want to point out first, Senator Case, something else, if I may, and I am going to get to this, but I want to tell you that I have gone through my thoughts

about this colloquy because, on the 10th of July 1973, there appeared an article in the Washington Post. This was before the transcript of the February 7 hearing had been declassified and made public. I believe it was made public, it says here, March 5, 1974.

Senator McGEE. This is July you are talking about, 1973?

Mr. HELMS. This is July 1973.

There was an article in the Washington Post in which a quotation is taken from my testimony, leaving out entirely the sentence "and about this time Army Intelligence became involved and kept files on U.S. citizens."

In other words, when this item in the testimony was leaked to the newspapers that was left out, but the rest of it was left in so that it looked as though I was answering the first part of the question, not the second part of the question.

Now I distinctly remember when I was asked that that I wanted very much to clear up any impression in your mind that we had done like Army Intelligence, that I was addressing myself to the part of the question where you said, "And during this period U.S. Army Intelligence was involved and kept files on U.S. citizens." I wanted to correct any impression you might have had that the CIA was doing the same thing.

And believe me, the first part of the question had simply gone out of my mind and in my desire to set your mind straight on something which I thought was very explosive indeed, that we go out and take photographs of war protestors, dissidents, and things of that kind because we had not done so.

HUSTON OPERATION

Now, may I say that when you said it was called to my attention in 1969 or 1970 the White House asked the intelligence agencies be joined, I never replied to that, I have to admit to you right now.

Sir, when I testified to this in 1973, I had totally forgotten about the Huston business. That was a very short episode. There was indeed a report written. It was aborted; it was not approved. We went back to doing business as we had always done before and it was not until Senator Symington later on in the Watergate hearings dug up the whole Huston thing this all came back in my memory.

I am being as honest as I know how; I simply did not remember it. But, Senator Case, would it have been too much to ask of you if you had in mind the Huston report you might have mentioned to me at that time that, "You had not been responsive to the first part of my question. What is this Huston report?"

Senator CASE. I am very happy to answer you, and you are entitled to an answer.

I knew nothing about the fact. I was relying upon something that had been alleged, and I was trying to give you a chance to reply. What never occurred to me was that you were answering a part of the question, and rather a small part, rather than the whole general question, that you were not forthcoming. That is what bothered me.

Mr. HELMS. You see, sir, may I say there are certain things that the Director of CIA gets pretty sensitive about; and one of the things is that he spies on Americans. When this came into your question, I totally focused on that because it seemed to me that was very impor-

tant, and I did not reply about the Huston thing at the time, I promise on my oath.

Senator CASE. I accept your statement and all I can say—
Mr. HELMS. I would like to go back to the Huston report because I would like to go a little farther on that.

The whole Huston operation started one morning in the White House when President Nixon called a meeting, and he had at the meeting Mr. Hoffer, General Bennett, Admiral Gayler, myself, and I am not sure who the aides were, but I guess Mr. Huston was there as well. I know a photograph was taken that morning.

The burden of that meeting, as best I recall it, was an injunction from the President to Mr. Hoover to organize a committee of the people there present and to examine the possibilities of getting increased coverage on Weathermen, Black Panthers; in other words, groups that were causing trouble and difficulties in the United States, protests of one sort or another.

I attended the meetings under Mr. Hoover's jurisdiction which led up to the writing of the report which was then submitted, with all of the signatures on it.

I want to assure you gentlemen that at no time in any of those meetings did I undertake on behalf of the Agency to do anything other than increase our activities in the foreign field in an effort to see whether there were Communists, Chinese, Russians, Algerians, or anybody else related to these dissident movements.

I did not agree, and regardless of whether Mr. Huston said I was cooperative or not, I was cooperative by coming to the meetings and making people available to help with the project, but I agreed to nothing, as best I recall it, that put me any farther into the domestic field than I would have been normally.

I believe it true also that when Mr. Huston testified before the Armed Services Committee, before Senator Symington during the Watergate period, that he actually pointed out to the committee at the time, I believe the record shows this, that he had been concerned about stories in the press that the White House was trying to tie the Agency into domestic intelligence work, that in point of fact his recommendation with respect to the CIA was simply that they increase their coverage of foreign activities, and I believe that is in the record, Senator Symington, somewhere.

MR. HOOVER'S OBJECTIONS TO HUSTON PLAN

Senator SYMINGTON. At the time Senator Stennis was ill in the hospital. I was acting chairman of the Armed Services Committee and called up the Central Intelligence Agency, said we wanted all pertinent papers. I turned the papers over to the staff of the Armed Services Committee and they had a good lawyer, who has since left the committee. He came up with a memorandum from Mr. Helms which said he—Helms—was astounded or astonished, one of those two words, to find the Attorney General knew nothing about the so-called Huston plan. We went to work to find Mr. Huston.

We found him and he talked to us. We have his testimony on the record.

We have read a lot of criticism of Mr. Hoover, J. Edgar Hoover, but never any that exceeded what came from Mr. Huston. At one

point Mr. Huston wrote in his memorandum, "We have heard Mr. Hoover's objection to this plan and it is a lot of" — I won't repeat the expletives. It gives an idea of the type and character of stuff going around at that time.

I suggested he come down and he did.

We just had had an unfortunate experience with a magazine article making charges against the CIA which proved false. The man who made the charges was exposed as a fraud. I could not see any reason for pursuing it further. The man was stateless, had no passport.

Getting back to Huston, after reading the memorandum which Helms wrote, it became pretty clear in my mind what happened, because the big objector to the Huston plan was Hoover. He knew it was a plan that was against the law.

When this CIA statute was written, I knew something about it, being on the National Security Council. My friend, Clark Clifford, wrote it up as Legal Counsel to the President.

It originally started in my opinion as an idea of Secretary Forrestal. The first Director of the CIA was a personal friend of the President and mine, Adm. Sidney Souers of St. Louis, Mo. The big problem going in was to overcome Hoover's objections. I believe Mr. Hoover told Mr. Mitchell, "I will not sign this plan unless I have written instructions from the President." When Mitchell said to him, "What plan?" the fat was in the fire.

I would be reasonably confident in my own mind the Attorney General then went to the President and said, "Mr. President, you cannot sign that letter because you are asking the Attorney General, through the Director of the FBI, to break the law." If you remember, in a speech or statement by President Nixon, he said the Huston plan was put into effect for 5 days, then withdrawn at the request of Mr. Hoover. That is on the public record.

BYPASSING OF MR. HELMS CONCERNING MEXICO

One other point: In this afternoon's paper, which I happened to see, Mr. Colson takes a belt at the CIA. Mr. Colson would not appear the most reliable of all witnesses.

What happened was Mr. Helms was called by Mr. Haldeman and asked to come over to Mr. Ehrlichman's office, and Haldeman said, not to Helms, but to General Walters, "I want you to go over and see Pat Gray and tell him to call this thing off in Mexico."

The record should show they were bypassing Mr. Helms, hoping to work through General Walters.

MILITARY'S INTEREST IN ESTIMATING THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY

It is important to know there are persons in the military anxious to get rid of the CIA, people who do not want those outside the Pentagon to argue with them about the threat.

A General wrote an article, General Graham, in which he said the Pentagon should decide the nature and degree of the threat. That was the net of it. So I called up the then Director of CIA, Secretary Schlesinger, and expressed my apprehension. He asked, "Have you read the entire article?" I said "No." "Well," he said, "read it, and I don't think you will feel that way." So I read it.

Senator CASE. When was this?

Senator SYMINGTON. April 1973. A magazine called "Army." The title was, "Estimating the Threat, a Soldier's Job."

After I read it I wrote Secretary Schlesinger and told him I was even more apprehensive, stating: "Specifically, where does this leave the CIA?"

The second paragraph of General Graham's article reads:

If the military profession loses its role in describing these threats to national security it surrenders its influence in decisions about military strategy, military force structure in the nature of its own armaments. We have in the past 10 years come perilously close to losing this vital role.

He later sums up—

To sum up, I think that the time is ripe for the military profession to reassert its traditional role in the function of describing military threats to national security.

This appeared a direct attack on civilian control. This general later became Assistant Director to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. After Mr. Schlesinger became Secretary of Defense, the same general moved back into the Defense Intelligence Agency and he is now the head of that agency, where he has more money and more influence in my opinion than anybody in the CIA.

So I think much is at stake here. I have no particular brief for Helms. If you are a spy you are a spy, and bound to get into situations where you cannot be fully candid about details, when you are told to do things some other people might think wrong. But I do question whether we want to pass over entirely to the military the decision as to what we do or do not need to defend the United States.

ILLUSTRATION OF DIEGO GARCIA

An illustration is the upcoming debate on Diego Garcia.

About 6 years ago the Chief of Naval Operations talked to me about using this island as a little communication center. This has now developed into plans for a carrier base, with a 12,500-foot airplane runway.

I went to Director Colby of the CIA and asked for an estimate of what the Soviets were doing in the Indian Ocean. Colby apparently has been somewhat massaged down—I use the word "massaged" advisedly—from his original position. His original position was nearly 180 degrees opposite to what the Pentagon said was being done in that Ocean. So I had Mr. Colby's statement declassified. Some was taken out, but much left in. I placed the declassified version in the Congressional Record.

What we are talking about now is whether we are going to have any real say about the threat if we destroy or seriously cripple the CIA.

MAJOR GENERAL DANIEL GRAHAM

Senator CASE. I want to ask you one question? Was this general, whatever his name was, who wrote this article, at that time deputy in the CIA?

Senator SYMINGTON. He was being made a Deputy in the CIA. Somebody came to me with his article entitled, "Estimating the Threat, the Soldier's Job." He is Maj. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, a 1946 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, now Deputy Director for Estimates in the Defense Intelligence Agency.

General Graham has served in several posts in the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency and commanded the 319th Military Intelligence Battalion, U.S. Army, Pacific.

In Vietnam he was Chief of Current Intelligence, Indications and Estimates Division.

He was Director of Intelligence Production in the Office of U.S. Military Assistance Command. He is considered an excellent officer.

He was transferred by Secretary Schlesinger to be his assistant when he became Director of Central Intelligence. I then wrote a letter, I would like to read it, it is short, into the record.

Dear Jim, —April 13, 1973—as you can see by the attached I have read the article in detail and have extracted certain statements, hopefully not out of context. At the end of the article as presented he states, "There is no longer a need in my judgment to duplicate DIA's efforts in other agencies." That article, plus the fact he is now going to work for you have created comment down here. I would hope we could get together soon re same. Sincerely.

I added in long hand, "Specifically, where does this leave the CIA?" This general is now back in the Pentagon as head of DIA. Again I say it is important, according to Helms' testimony recently, to note that the CIA today gets 15 cents of the total intelligence tax dollar.

SENATOR CASE'S REASON FOR PRESSING

Senator CASE. I would like to say one thing. The reason I press this, first of all, is that my name is involved. Second, I am one of those who has always tried to support the proper activity of the CIA and its function. I join Senator Symington in wanting it to be the top intelligence estimating body in our Government.

We do find it difficult. We are constantly hit by statements in the press and other places that make it appear as if we had been not told the whole truth.

Mr. HELMS. I hope I have been responsive to that point and this was exactly the way it all happened in my mind.

MR. HELMS' RESPONSE TO HUSTON REPORT QUESTION

Senator CASE. If I can paraphrase it, you thought you were answering only the latter part of the question and not dealing with the general part, which was in my mind the main thing and—

Mr. HELMS. I understood that in retrospect when I read in the paper you really were referring to the Huston report, this came as a surprise to me.

Senator CASE. I don't think I knew at that time about the Huston report, but I had heard reports about this kind of agency or this kind of operation.

Mr. HELMS. You see, this is one of those circumstances under which I had no reluctance to discuss any aspect of your question, so I really was foolhardy.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden has tried several times to raise a question.

Senator SCOTT. Before we leave this, because I haven't had any at all, I have two questions but I can wait.

EXTENT OF CIA PARTICIPATION IN HUSTON PLAN

Senator BIDEN. It is really not a question. It is a clarification in the response, because I was not privy to all of this.

When you were Director, sir, and I do apologize, I was still in college. I know little or nothing about this subject and admit it. I understand in response to Senator Case's question, you indicated with regard to the Huston plan that you did not recall at the time of the questioning the existence of such a plan. Now that you recall it, you indicate that you resisted or would have resisted.

I am not sure I understand, whether that is a term of art, what "resisted" means. I don't know.

Mr. HELMS. Senator, let me be more specific and use plainer language. There has been an allegation in the newspapers, which has been repeated over and over again like a dripping tap, that I was very cooperative with this effort. The effort as identified in the newspapers is domestic espionage or domestic surveillance of war groups and so forth.

All I simply wanted to say was that the participation in the Huston Plan by the CIA had only to do with our giving assurance that we would increase our effort overseas in the foreign field to find out if there were connections with these various dissident groups in the United States. We did not undertake to do anything in the domestic intelligence field, and I am directing that reply to the newspaper statement that I was very cooperative, the imputation or implication which was I had gotten into something I had not been in before or should have have gotten into, and this is what I am trying to clear up.

Senator BIDEN. That explains a lot to me.

SENSITIVITY TO DOMESTIC SPYING ALLEGATION

I was interested in your statement saying that you can understand, as former Director of CIA, presently Ambassador, that the CIA is very sensitive to charges of spying on American citizens. I would like to add if you are sensitive to that charge, I, as a Senator, who never even thought of these things before, am supersensitive to the thought that someone in your agency, whether or not it happened, or any other agency of this Government would spy on someone who is a U.S. Senator or Congressman. I say that only for the purposes of reinforcing what you already know. If you are sensitive, you can imagine why Senator Case or anyone else around here is sensitive to the domestic spying allegation.

CIA ACTIVITY IN CHILE DURING POST-ELECTION PERIOD

Senator CHURCH. Let's go back to the Chile matter.

I have one or two questions which will complete the series.

I am going back once more to the specifics of the letter that we received, the Harrington letter.

We are now in the period in 1970 to 1973, and here are the specific allegations concerning the CIA activity during that postelection period.

First, that during the period 1971 to 1973 an additional \$5 million was authorized by the Forty Committee for more destabilization

efforts, which included support of an unnamed but influential anti-Allende newspaper.

Do you recall that?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

I don't know about the word "destabilized." I think the first time I ever came across that word was when I read it in the Paris Herald Tribune, which gets to Tehran a day late. Congressman Harrington said this. I don't recall that word having been used in the period.

I certainly remember that a decision was made in the Forty Committee to put money into I believe the newspaper [deleted] and also into certain radio stations to keep alive some voice, some opinion, something that was not totally Allende. Whether the sum of money was what you say it is, I do not recall, but I have no reason to question that.

Senator CHURCH. The second charge is that an additional \$1½ million was expended in the municipal elections of 1973, for anti-Allende activities.

Mr. HELMS. This, sir, I simply do not recall. I was leaving the Agency, as you remember, starting at the end of 1972 and I just don't remember whether this was done or not. In other words, I am simply innocent of it.

Senator CHURCH. Then, finally, in the letter again it is alleged that in August 1973 an additional \$1 million was authorized by the Forty Committee for further political destabilization activities, although the Agency turned down the request for \$50,000 to support a trucker's strike.

Do you have any recollection of the final \$1 million authorized?

Mr. HELMS. I ceased to be Director, I think, early in February of that year. I went off to Tehran and I know nothing whatever about this.

DID CIA TRY TO OVERTHROW PRESIDENT ALLENDE?

Senator CHURCH. Based upon what you did know concerning the activities that took place between 1970 and 1973, that is the period during which the Allende regime was in power, when Senator Symington asked the question, "Did you try in the CIA to overthrow the Government of Chile?" you replied "No, sir."

Do you want to make any further comment on that?

Mr. HELMS. I would like to say what I said a few moments ago. I think you were out of the room. I would like to repeat myself.

There was no doubt that the Nixon administration would like to have had President Allende overthrown. In the narrow compass of the days of the election that you are talking about in 1970, that became a thing that they were interested in having done.

As best I recall, a very secret probe was made to find out whether there was anything in Chile that looked like a force that would overthrow Allende.

The Allende government was not even in at the time the probe was made, just to see if there were any forces there to oppose Allende's advent as President. It was very quickly established there were not, and therefore, no further effort was made along those lines, to the best of my knowledge, at least I know of none. Even though we had been charged to try and find out, I believe a report came back that there was no way to do this.

Senator CASE. This was between the popular election and the congressional election?

Mr. HELMS. That is my recollection.

If anything of record shows anything different, I am glad to be corrected, but that was my impression.

Looking back at the various things that certainly were done, I cannot understand how anyone could interpret them as an attempt to overthrow the Government or believe that they stood a chance of doing so. So that is what I meant when I answered Senator Symington's question there was really no effort made to overthrow the Government of Chile. And Senator, since we are on this subject, let me just say something about the Congressman Harrington letter.

In Congressman Harrington's letter the words used in there are the kind of words that get written into covert action plans. They sound exotic, tough, all of the rest. I think when you get the entire story laid out in Chile between 1970 and 1973 you are going to regard that as a pretty pitiful affair, I mean in terms of actually accomplishing anything.

Senator CHURCH. I have finished with my questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Scott.

Senator SCOTT. Could I go off record a minute?

[Discussion off the record.]

STORY CONCERNING HOWARD HUNT'S DELIVERY OF PACKAGES TO
RICHARD OBER

Senator SCOTT. Mr. Helms, there is a story, which I think has appeared in the paper, although I have not read it, that Howard Hunt delivered certain packages to Richard Ober, who delivered them to you. I'm told that Ober was a CIA man in the White House.

Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, I don't know what this refers to. In the first place, I would like to know the year, but I don't believe that Mr. Ober was serving in the White House during that 1970-1971-1972 time period. I believe at that time he was out in the Agency building. And if Mr. Hunt was passing communications to somebody from the CIA who was serving in the White House, I'm not familiar with it.

Now, maybe my recollection is bad, maybe there was something like this, but I don't recall it, sir.

Senator SCOTT. In other words, you have no recollection of a Mr. Ober delivering any packages to you asserted to be from Mr. Hunt?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. I do not recall that.

DID MR. HELMS GIVE HOWARD HUNT \$20,000?

Senator SCOTT. The second question, I think, also derives from a news story. That is that Mr. Charles Colson told Senator Weicker that Howard Hunt had told Colson that he had received \$20,000 in cash from Richard Helms.

I have no other information on that except I noticed in the memorandum that assistance to Hunt terminated August 27.

Would you comment on that?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, I have heard that a little before and if I smile it is only because my total income over the years I have been in the

Government is my salary plus a pittance from my father's estate and a small amount from about two or three stocks that I own, and that I would never have been in the position at any time during my tenure in government to lend anybody \$20,000.

Now, what I believe is being confused here is, and I don't have the details clearly in my mind at all anymore, but there was a time when Hunt was still employed by the CIA when he was having a very difficult time with a daughter who had psychiatric and injury difficulties from an automobile accident and he had very heavy medical bills, and I believe that he was permitted to borrow some money from an Agency fund for the purpose of helping out employees who are in difficulty, financial difficulty, and my recollection is that he paid the amount back when he got a settlement from the insurance company.

That is the best I can do, sir, but I am sure if you would like more detail they must have it out at the Agency because I know this came up a couple of years ago in connection with the whole Watergate business.

Senator SCOTT. In other words, you never gave him \$20,000 or any part thereof?

Mr. HELMS. I personally did not.

Senator SCOTT. And you had no awareness of any such \$20,000 donation?

Mr. HELMS. No.

I heard of the loan from the Agency fund much later when this charge was first made, but it was not something I was familiar with at the time, as best I recall it.

MR. HELMS' DENIAL OF SIGNIFICANT "RECENT" ROLE IN CHILE

Senator SCOTT. Our memorandum says before leaving for Iran you appeared before the full committee in executive session for the benefit of the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations to discuss the Chile affair, that you denied any significant recent CIA role in Chile.

It is the word "recent" I would like to get clarified.

Mr. HELMS. I hardly think that is a correct characterization of my testimony and since we have gone over this with Senator Church this morning I think the record will show what this was all about, sir, if that is satisfactory to you.

Senator SCOTT. That is all I want to find out. We might want to go into activities in other places later, but not now.

CONGRESSIONAL SURVEILLANCE IN INTELLIGENCE FIELD

Senator CASE. I don't know whether the Ambassador is going to be around for awhile or not.

Ambassador HELMS. I am hoping to leave on Sunday.

Senator CASE. I don't press for my rights to raise the matter now before Senator McGovern or anybody has had his chance, but sometime I would like to get the Ambassador's thoughts on the question of how any kind of surveillance by Congress can actually operate in the intelligence field, as I have grave doubts about any of these various schemes. But I don't want to interrupt until all of the members have had their round.

CIA RESISTANCE TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH REQUESTS FOR DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES

Senator McGOVERN. Mr. Chairman, do we have time for a few more?

In reply to Senator Case's interrogation awhile ago you said that you had overlooked part of the question that he had raised. It was simply a memory lapse, rather than an oversight.

In interrogation on May 21 before the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Pell asked you this question, on page 99. He said, "Besides Mr. Hunt's activities, have there been any other requests that you have turned down from the executive branch of Government to engage in domestic activities?" You replied, "Well, Senator Pell, in answering that question, I do not recall of any specific requests by an individual to do such things. There have been at various times, and I say at various times because I can't specify it, conversations about whether it would be desirable to have the Agency do certain types of domestic operations which the FBI were not performing very satisfactorily. This has been something that has been totally 100 percent resisted."

Do you stand on that?

Ambassador HELMS. Sir, when I came back this time I got ahold of two of the officers who had served with me in the Agency and are now retired from the Agency to ask if I had overlooked anything here and one of them said that he recalled that U.S. Marshal's office had once asked for some kind of assistance that we decided was really not for the Agency to handle and turned it down, but it was a request.

There was also a request at one time I believe from what was then the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for some assistance in the United States, and I believe this assistance was given rather briefly and then terminated.

Now, the precise details of it I am frank to say I don't have in my mind anymore. It was not something that we went out and we were supporting them in some fashion, and if you want or need any greater detail, please get the Agency to give it to you because I just don't recall, but I am trying to as best I can, with the recollection of a couple of others, to be sure that I am totally responsive to these questions, so we don't have a lot of hangnails around here that keep coming up.

Senator McGOVERN. The Hunt matter is the only thing that you can recall of a specific nature that you were requested to become involved in that had to do with domestic activities?

Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir. If you want, Senator McGovern, if the chairman and Senator Church and Senator Case would like, I could, I think, in the space of about 5 minutes explain where a lot of the turmoil is in the press about the Agency's activities. Obviously you are going to have Mr. Colby up and he is going to testify, but I would like you to hear it from me so you don't feel I was here and say Helms never said anything about those things. If you would finish, sir, then I will gladly do this.

PROVISION OF U.S. NAMES TO CIA BY IDIU

Senator McGOVERN. Because of the pressure of time here I would like to take several quotations from Mr. Colby's testimony before the Appropriations Committee this past January 17 and have you respond to those. These are quotations. I can supply the page numbers if you wish. Mr. Colby said, "In 1967 the Department of Justice established the Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit. In May 1970 the Department of Justice provided the CIA with a machine tape listing of about 10,000 Americans developed by the IDIU."

Do you substantiate that?

Ambassador HELMS. Sir, I heard this when Mr. Colby was testifying about this for the first time.

May I explain something about the background of all of this?

I think, sir, it will be helpful in response to some of the things you are going to ask, I hope. Please go ahead and question me, but I want to give a little background here.

When Mr. Schlesinger was Director of the Agency, I believe it was sometime in March 1973, and because I gather these documents are available, they have been given to the other Senate committees, I am sure they are available to you—he sent a memorandum to every employee of the Central Intelligence Agency inviting them to come up with any example of anything that they knew about what had happened over the years that any of them felt was either outside the Agency's charter, in excess of the Agency's charter, or anything of that kind. It was a blanket invitation to have there things brought forward.

As a result of this, a lot of things came to light that maybe I hadn't known about or maybe they were under somebody's directorship and so forth. The principal point that I want to make to help out with this hearing is that in these items that Mr. Colby mentioned in his report are a whole series of activities of the Office of Security of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Now, the Office of Security has nothing to do with foreign operations; it is an entity that has been there since the Agency was founded to protect the security of its installations, to investigate the personnel and check them out for integrity and so forth, to be sure that employees remained loyal, to be sure that physical penetrations of Agency installations didn't take place, and to follow up on activities which could be put under the rubric that the Director is involved with to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

Now, that particular sentence is not only in the National Security Act of 1947 but it is reinforced in the CIA Act of 1949 plus some additional language which appears in Mr. Colby's report.

The Office of Security, therefore, in pursuance of this effort engaged in certain activities which I am glad to describe. Colby is going to come before you and he will go over this so we don't need to have two hearings on this. But they had nothing to do with what in our parlance, in our work, had to do with domestic activities. In other words, we are located in the United States, that was protection of our installation, people, documents from unauthorized disclosure, and so forth. These things have gotten mixed up and they got mixed up in the public mind and they have gotten mixed up here because, whether you are critical of them or not, at least understand what they are.

CIA'S ROLE CONCERNING SUBVERSION OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS

Senator CASE. Could I ask a question for clarification?

In your understanding, is the activity of foreign governments or foreign persons in trying to subvert our domestic institutions one of the CIA's functions under its charter?

Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. That question is to me still an open one. Why wouldn't the subversion of domestic institutions, whether done by foreigners or people at home, be a matter for the FBI?

Ambassador HELMS. Sir, it is. The only role that the Agency has in that question, and I think the role is clearly identification in foreign countries of foreign people who might come to the United States, and it is for this reason we have this vast exchange between the FBI and CIA over the years a great deal of which has resulted from the so-called files that you hear about, which are nothing but memorandums from the FBI with the same name in it which obviously has to be indexed, and therefore a file was opened.

Senator CASE. This was an area that I haven't been able to clarify.

Ambassador HELMS. It is kind of a tricky area. The way we played this, I wouldn't say game, obviously it wasn't a game—the way we did this was when the Agency got information from France, Germany, or the Soviet Union about someone whom we thought possibly was a spy, or a bomber, or a terrorist, or something of this kind, coming to the United States, we would send a report down to the FBI, and in some cases the Immigration and Naturalization Service, in some cases the Secret Service. If the FBI had a man they knew about in New York and he went to France or something they would send us a memorandum about him and say this fellow moved from point A to point B, and I think that I am trying to make a helpful suggestion here, that I think the Rockefeller Commission will undoubtedly call the retired FBI man who was liaison between the FBI and CIA for many, many years, and he is just a fund of information on these matters and he saw it from both sides because, as you know, the FBI always liaised on our playing field but you didn't liaison on their playing field, and he is just a fund of information on this kind of thing. He can give you chapter and verse as to how this worked.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else?

CONGRESSIONAL SURVEILLANCE OF COVERT ACTIVITIES

Senator CASE. Do you have any comment as to how we can have a congressional or any other kind of surveillance organization dealing with covert activities, which by their nature have to be kept secret? Without such congressional surveillance the CIA becomes in effect just another arm of the National Security Council for covert activity? I would like to know just how you resolve this dilemma in your mind. I have been very skeptical of an oversight committee because I can't see what good a committee does if it can't tell what it knows. For example—

Ambassador HELMS. Well, sir, I have for years been wondering about this. You remember that when I testified a couple of years ago I think Senator Humphrey asked me about it, and I just want to say this: I find this an enormously difficult legal, moral, and all other

kinds of a question, and the reason I find it so is that as elected representatives of the people you have to go before the people from time to time, and if you had all known about the Bay of Pigs before it happened, had been told about this, an operation, incidentally, which two Presidents thought was worthwhile, what would it have looked like when you were asked to admit did you know about the Bay of Pigs, were you involved in it, and did you approve it, even though it had come under your noses and you wanted to ask for approval, you were asked to say nothing, but you would have to say obviously: "Yes; I was aware there was such a thing as the Bay of Pigs."

Now, the Chilean operation is another thing. Would you really want to go back to the electorate and say: "Yes; I was the fellow who approved operations which were going to cause trouble in a foreign country."

Gentlemen, I simply can't go any further. I simply pose the problem. I suppose that there is some—I don't know whether there is a way through it. I have to say, to be honest, that I am skeptical. That is all I can say.

Senator SCOTT. What you are saying, if I could interrupt, is that any Member of Congress serving on such a committee once made aware of these things is liable to be put in the same public dilemma that the recent controversy has put you in?

Ambassador HELMS. I think this is quite possible, sir. I have had a remarkably good experience with the Congress of the United States. I have not been the victim of leaks about CIA operations when I was Director. I had every confidence. I have appeared before this committee, Armed Services, and so forth, and nobody has ever done me in. As far as I am aware, leaks about me have been in connection with quite other things, they had nothing to do with the fiduciary relationship I have established with Congressmen and Senators. I even had a good relationship with Congressman Harrington when I used to appear before the House Armed Services Committee. So I am not one of those people that feel the Congress can't keep secrets. I am simply referring to the difficulty that you have of your conscience, that is all.

Senator CASE. And somethimes I suppose, if you are going to say that a committee has had the right to know all that goes on, you must carry it one step further and say the committee and its members have the right to make that so, if they think it is the right thing to do, to disclose it and they cannot be put under an obligation not to disclose it.

Ambassador HELMS. It makes it pretty tough.

MR. HELMS' KNOWLEDGE OF MR. HUNT'S OPERATIONS

Senator McGOVERN. I know we are up against a real time factor here. I am trying to get this into a couple of minutes here.

There is an article that appeared in the New York Times by Walter Pincus, on October 2, 1974.

Are you familiar with that?

Ambassador HELMS. No, sir, I am not.

Senator McGOVERN. There are very serious charges made. Among others, Mr. Pincus says you were apparently covering up information relevant to a criminal investigation then underway. He is referring to your testimony before this committee on May 21, 1973, when you

were asked about your knowledge of Mr. Hunt's operations, including the two break-ins at Dr. Fielding's office and the reasons why the CIA stopped supplying help to Mr. Hunt. You said it had nothing to do with the photographs that were taken of Dr. Fielding's office, but rather that he was asking so many things from the Agency that he had become in your opinion a threat to the Agency. So you cut him off, but it had nothing to do with your knowledge about the break-in. Is that your position today?

Ambassador HELMS. No, Senator McGovern. I have the greatest respect for Mr. Pincus. I think he is an extraordinarily able individual and I have read a lot of pieces by him that I think go to the heart of a lot of matters. I have great regard for him, but sir, this is simply not true that I knew about Dr. Fielding, the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office. I had seen some photographs, but nobody had ever identified to me what buildings those photographs were of. And as I testified, I believe on that very day, of May 21, the first I ever heard of Dr. Fielding was when I was sitting in Shiraz, Iran, one day and picked up the local newspaper and it was said that his office had been broken into. I promise you, Senator McGovern.

Senator McGOVERN. Apparently, members of the CIA knew about this. They were supplying material to Hunt. They developed the film apparently, and saw the name Fielding on the part in the parking lot. Members of the Agency knew about that. The thing that puzzles me is why as Director of the Agency something that sensitive wouldn't have been called to your attention.

Senator SYMINGTON. Perhaps I can answer part of that because I held the hearings on it. Hunt did not go to Helms. He went to General Cushman through a White House phone.

To the best of my recollection, he said he wanted a wig and this and that and he said in effect this is the White House asking.

General Cushman was a fine Marine Commandant. It was my privilege to see him running the Marines at Danang. Nevertheless, this was not his field. For a while he began to supply everything Hunt wanted because he thought that was what Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman wanted. At one point, however, Hunt's requests he felt were out of line, so he himself decided not to continue to work with him. At no time, to the best of my memory, did he ever say he had discussed this with Mr. Helms.

Am I correct on that?

Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir, in the early stages. And another aspect of this, Senator McGovern, as best I recall all this, and it is in hindsight and I have been back and testified many times in connection with this Watergate business, no one had ever intimated to me until that date in 1973 when I read in Shiraz that Mr. Ellsberg had a psychiatrist, that it was a man named Dr. Fielding and his office had been broken into.

I put my hand up, sir.

SENATE WATERGATE REPORT—SENATOR BAKER'S VIEWS

Senator McGOVERN. In the interests of time would you look at this article by Mr. Pincus at your convenience, and then also look at the material that Senator Baker has supplied in the Watergate report, between pages 1135 and 1144, which seems to be supportive of the charges made by Mr. Pincus?

Ambassador HELMS. Really?

Senator McGOVERN. As I read it, it seems to be supportive.

For example, Senator Baker says, "Thereafter, pursuant to the specific approval of both Cushman and then Director of the CIA Richard Helms, a member of the CIA Technical Services Division was assigned to provide Hunt with assistance and materials he requested."

Ambassador HELMS. No question about that.

Senator McGOVERN. You agree with that?

Ambassador HELMS. Yes, sir. But I don't quite see what it has to do with Dr. Fielding.

Senator McGOVERN. Let me continue. "The preparation of this profile," referring to a psychiatric profile on Mr. Ellsberg, "was specifically approved by then Director Helms in late July of 1971."

Ambassador HELMS. Yes; that is correct. I believe I have testified to that and said this in several records that this is true.

Senator McGOVERN. Then Senator Baker goes on to develop the concern of the psychiatrist that this whole operation was getting into an area that threatened the good name of the Agency, and Senator Baker says:

* * * it is not without significance that the time period during which the CIA psychiatrist was briefing his superiors of his concerns regarding Hunt was circa August 20, 1971—a week prior to the developing of Hunt's film of "intriguing" photographs of medical offices in southern California, which impressed at least one CIA official as "easing" photographs.

Ambassador HELMS. I don't know who that official is.

Senator McGOVERN. And then it says:

Director Helms took pains to inform the White House that: "I do wish to underline the point that our involvement in this matter should not be revealed in any context, formal or informal."

Ambassador HELMS. That quotation has only to do with the call that I made to Mr. David Young in connection with the profile on Daniel Ellsberg. I had nothing to do with anything else. That I remember vividly because I have been over this.

Senator McGovern, may I plead that you will find I am sure that I have testified to all these things before and testified under oath. Really I have, sir.

[The Information referred to follows:]

[Excerpt from Individual Views of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., to Senate Report No. 93-981, 93d Cong., 2 sess., "The Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, U.S. Senate]

HUNT—TSD SUPPORT—ELLSBERG PROFILE

The Committee has received much testimony over the past several months detailing the extensive support of Howard Hunt by CIA personnel with CIA materials and the CIA's role in the preparation of the psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg. Howard Hunt was involved in a wide variety of domestic undertakings with the use of CIA equipment and the assistance of CIA personnel, e.g., the burglaries of Dr. Fielding's office and the DNC, the preparation of psychological profiles on Daniel Ellsberg and the investigation of the Chappaquidick incident. In light of the facts and circumstances developed through the documents and conflicting testimony of CIA personnel adduced by this Committee, which are summarized below, the question arises as to whether the CIA had advance knowledge of the Fielding break-in. The Fielding burglary was not made public until May of 1973.

While the CIA has previously belatedly acknowledged some of the technical support it provided to Hunt and Liddy prior to the Fielding break-in, the CIA has continually downplayed the extent of that technical support as well as the specific approval and detailed knowledge of such support by high level CIA officials.¹ The

scenario of events culminating in the Fielding break-in caused a wealth of conflicting testimony among CIA officials as referred to hereinafter.

The CIA's assistance to Hunt began on July 22, 1971, when Hunt met with General Cushman, then Deputy Director of the CIA, in Cushman's office to request physical disguise and phony identification to effect a "one time operation, in and out."² This meeting was tape recorded by Cushman. Thereafter, pursuant to the specific approval of both Cushman and then Director of the CIA Richard Helms, a member of the CIA's Technical Services Division was assigned to provide Hunt with the assistance and materials he requested.³ During the next thirty days, the CIA technical staff met with Hunt on four separate occasions. Most meetings were held at CIA "safe houses" (dwellings owned or leased by the CIA for clandestine meetings).⁴ At those meetings Hunt was provided with the CIA equipment and assistance described in earlier Committee testimony, i.e., a wig, voice alteration devices, heel lift to cause a limp,⁵ fake glasses, phony driver's licenses and identification cards, a Uher 5000 tape recorder disguised in a typewriter case, a camera hidden in a tobacco pouch, preliminary steps toward a phony New York telephone answering device, and the developing of the film of Hunt and Liddy's reconnaissance trip to Los Angeles to "case" Dr. Fielding's office.⁶ This assistance was abruptly terminated on August 27, 1971—one week before the Fielding burglary of September 3, 1971.⁷

Recent testimony and documents have developed several matters of considerable import with regard to the assistance provided Hunt and Liddy. The technician who dealt with Hunt has testified that he received approval for each and every request of Hunt from his supervisory officials at the CIA.⁸ He also testified that, contrary to earlier and other CIA testimony, Hunt informed him early in August that he would be introducing a second man (Liddy) to the technician for the provision of disguise and false identification.⁹ CIA officials heretofore had claimed that Hunt introduced Liddy unannounced late in August and that this introduction had been one of the leading causes for the CIA's ultimate termination of its support for Hunt.¹⁰

Testimony and documents have also revealed, again contrary to the testimony of high CIA officials, that Hunt's request for a New York "backstopped" telephone (a telephone with a New York number which would in reality be answered by a Washington CIA switchboard) answering service was well on its way to completion.¹¹ A detailed memorandum of the TSD technician, dated August 27, 1971, reveals that the backstopped telephone request was about to be implemented.¹² This memorandum includes the actual relay number to be called. Previous CIA testimony had always been to the effect that this telephone request was so unreasonable that it was immediately disapproved and that it was also a leading cause of the ultimate termination of Hunt's support.¹³

Recent testimony also established that the CIA created a file on Hunt's activities entitled the "Mr. Edward" file. This file was maintained outside the normal

¹ See affidavits of Cushman, [Exec. Asst. to DDCI], and [Deputy Chief, TSD], Original CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab D.

² Partial tape transcript of July 22 meeting, Original CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab K, at 1; see also Cushman's affidavit, *id.*, and complete unabridged tape transcript of July 22 meeting, CIA Supplemental Materials, Volume II, Tab 4.

³ See Executive Session Testimony of General Robert E. Cushman, March 7, 1974, at 10, 12; *contra*, Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, March 8, 1974, and Testimony of Richard Helms before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, May 16, 1973, at 195-196.

⁴ See Executive Session Testimony of [TSD Technician #1], February 5 and 6, 1974 at 3-25 (February 5 tr.), and Exhibit 1 to that testimony (notes of [TSD Technician #1] compiled contemporaneously with the support of Hunt) also found in CIA Supplemental Materials, Volume VII, Tab 8.

⁵ Staff interview with Howard Hunt, February 4, 1974.

⁶ Public Testimony of Richard Helms and General Robert E. Cushman, August 2, 1973; affidavits of [TSD Technician #1], TSD Technician #2, Deputy Chief, TSD, and Exec. Asst to DDCI], Original CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab D.

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ Executive Session Testimony of [TSD Technician #1], *supra* note 4 at 10 (February 6 tr.), at 57 (February 5 tr.).

⁹ *Id.* at 55-57 (February 5 tr.); see also notes referred to in note 4, *supra*.

¹⁰ Affidavits of [Exec. Asst. to DDCI] [Deputy Chief, TSD], Cushman, *supra* note 1; memoranda [of Exec. Asst. to DDCI] dated August 23, 26, and 30, Original CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab K; compare Executive Session Testimony of [TSD Technician #1], *supra* note 4 at 55-56 (February 5 tr.) with Executive Session Testimony of [Deputy Chief, TSD], February 5, 1974, at 24.

¹¹ Executive Session Testimony of [TSD Technical #1], *supra* note 4 at 8-10, 12 (February 6), and Exhibit 1 to [TSD Technician #1]'s testimony at 5, which details the steps taken by the CIA to implement Hunt's request.

¹² *Id.*

¹³ See affidavits of [Exec. Asst. to DDCI] [Deputy Chief, TSD], Cushman, and memoranda of [Exec. Asst. to DDCI], *supra* note 10; Executive Session Testimony of Cushman, March 7, 1974, at 19-21. Moreover, Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, *supra* note 3, indicates that it was Hunt's request for a secretary which caused him to order the cut-off of support. This request, however, occurred on August 18 and was denied the same or next day, see Executive Session Testimony of [Exec. Asst. to DDCI], March 6, 1974 (transcription not presently available), *contra*, testimony of Richard Helms before the Senate Committee on Appropriations *supra* note 3, at 197.

CIA filing system, and this Committee's requests to obtain this file have not been granted, despite the fact that testimony has established that this file was turned over to Director Colby after the Watergate break-in.¹⁴ Moreover, recent testimony also indicates that a "bigot list" (CIA term for treatment of especially sensitive case restricting access to a limited number of persons) was created for Hunt's activities.¹⁵

Testimony has indicated that the film developed for Hunt and Liddy was, in fact, of Dr. Fielding's office.¹⁶ Not only was the film developed, however, but it was reviewed by CIA supervisory officials before it was returned to Hunt.¹⁷ One CIA official who reviewed the film admitted that he found the photographs "intriguing" and recognized them to be of "southern California."¹⁸ *He then ordered one of the photographs to be blown up. The blow-up revealed Dr. Fielding's name in the parking lot next to his office.*¹⁹ Another CIA official has testified that he speculated that they were "casing" photographs.²⁰ Recent testimony has shown that *the CIA official who reviewed these photographs immediately reported their content to Cushman and his assistant in the office of the Deputy Director of the CIA.*²¹ With a degree of incredulity, however, he denies telling his superiors that he blew up one of the photographs and that it revealed the name of Dr. Fielding.²² Moreover, both Cushman and his assistant denied ever having been told about the content of the photographs by [Deputy Chief, TSD] or anyone else.²³ In any event, recent testimony shows that it was only after these photographs were developed and examined that the CIA technician dealing with Hunt was ordered to cut off all support for Hunt.²⁴ This decision was made by the Deputy Director of the CIA (Cushman) and/or the Director of the CIA (Helms).²⁵

Finally, while previous public CIA testimony claimed that the CIA "had no contact whatsoever with Mr. Hunt subsequent to 31 August, 1971,"²⁶ recent testimony and secret documents indicate that Hunt had extensive contact with the CIA after that date. Not only did Hunt play a large role in the CIA's development of psychological profiles on Daniel Ellsberg (not completed until November of 1971,) but he actually contacted the CIA's External Employment Assistance Branch (EEAB) and approached active CIA personnel regarding several operations, including, e.g., Hunt's requests to the CIA for person(s) skilled in lock-picking, electronic sweeping, and entry operations.²⁷

It is significant that during the same time period as the ongoing support of Hunt by the CIA, August of 1971, the CIA was also compiling a psychological

¹⁴ Executive Session Testimony of [Deputy Chief, TSD], February 5, 1974, at 14-15; Executive Session Testimony of [Chief, TSD], February 3, 1974, at 29-30.

¹⁵ Executive Session Testimony of [TSD Technical #1], *supra* note 4, at 2-4 (February 6 tr.).

¹⁶ Executive Session Testimony of [Executive Officer to Director of Security], March 3, 1974 (transcription not presently available); Staff interview of Howard Hunt, *supra* note 5 (wherein Hunt indicates that the film the CIA developed included shots of a "close-up of (Fielding's office) door, a close-up of the directory of (Fielding's) building, photographs of the ingress and egress of the parking lot . . ." as well as shots of the inside of Fielding's office, including the top of Fielding's desk).

¹⁷ Executive Session Testimony of [TSD Technical #1], *supra* note 4 at 20-24, 52-53 (February 5 tr.); Executive Session Testimony of [Deputy Chief, TSD], *supra* note 14 at 43-47.

¹⁸ Executive Session Testimony of [Deputy Chief, TSD], *supra* note 14 at 44.

¹⁹ *Id.* at 45-46.

²⁰ Executive Session Testimony of [Chief, TSD], February 5, 1974, at 19-20.

²¹ Executive Session Testimony of [Deputy Chief, TSD], *supra* note 14 at 47-49.

²² *Id.*

²³ Executive Session Testimony of General Robert E. Cushman, March 7, 1974, at 22-23; Executive Session Testimony of [Exec. Asst. to DDCI], March 6, 1974 (transcription not presently available).

²⁴ Executive Session Testimony of [TSD Technical #1], *supra* note 4, at 59-60, and Exhibit 1 to that testimony.

²⁵ Executive Session Testimony of General Robert E. Cushman, March 7, 1974, at 21-22, 16-20; Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, March 8, 1974, *contra* (transcription not presently available).

²⁶ Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters Memorandum for Record, July 28, 1972, Original CIA Materials, Volume I, Tab S.

²⁷ Contacts after August 31, 1971, indicated in the Secret Supplemental CIA Materials, include the following:

(a) Hunt was referred to [Former CIA employee] by [Chief, EEAB] of the CIA's EEAB, ([Chief, EEAB] referred on June 19, 1972) when Hunt requested a "retired lockpicker" and entry man in the time period of March-May, 1972. CIA Supplemental Materials, Volume I, Tab 4, Memorandum of June 19, 1973.

(b) Hunt, in late 1971, requested some "security types" to check physical security and monitor telephones in Las Vegas" in connection with Hunt's work on the Hughes account with Mullen and Company. Hunt, was referred by [Chief, EEAB] to an [Agency proprietary (name deleted at Agency request)] (CIA Supplemental Materials, Volume I, Tab 4).

(c) Hunt contacted [deleted at Agency request] (an active CIA employee until November 10, 1972) sometime in late 1971 regarding a weekend entry operation.

(d) Hunt contacted CIA employee [deleted at Agency request] October of 1971 concerning certain *Indochina War documents* (Original CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab D).

(e) On December 8, 1971, Hunt requested and received a CIA computer name trace, by CIA employees, on a person who had allegedly formed the [deleted name of Latin American country at Agency request] National Independent Party in December of 1971 (Original CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab D).

(f) The CIA acknowledges that the Deputy Director of Plans of the CIA did meet with Hunt on October 15, 1971 to discuss Mullen and Company problems.

profile on Daniel Ellsberg. Recent testimony has revealed that Hunt was deeply involved in that project as well.

The preparation of this profile was specifically approved by then Director Helms in late July of 1971.²⁸ The actual compiling of the profile was done by the CIA's medical services staff and, in particular, its chief psychiatrist.²⁹ Testimony has indicated that a meeting was held on August 12, 1971, in which both Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy participated. They told the CIA psychiatrist that Ellsberg had been undergoing psychiatric analysis. Hunt and Liddy discussed with him their desire to "try Ellsberg in public," render him "the object of pity as a broken man," and be able to refer to Ellsberg's "Ocdipal complex."³⁰ At the close of the meeting, Hunt asked the psychiatrist not to reveal his presence in the profile discussions to anyone at the CIA, stating that he already had been in contact with General Cushman and was on good terms with Director Helms. The psychiatrist has testified recently that he was extremely concerned about Hunt's presence and remarks. He so reported this to his CIA superiors, both in memoranda and in a meeting on August 20, 1971. Access to the memoranda of both the psychiatrist and his superiors has been refused to this Committee.³¹

The CIA psychiatrist also was given the name of Dr. Fielding as Ellsberg's psychiatrist and numerous FBI reports of interviews with Ellsberg's associates, as well as a memorandum of a reported telephone conversation between Ellsberg and another party.³² *And recent testimony has revealed that it was reported back to the psychiatrist that Director Helms was advised of his concerns regarding Hunt's participation and comments.*³³ While Director Helms has denied that he was ever told that Hunt was involved in the CIA's Ellsberg profile project,³⁴ it is not without significance that the time period during which the CIA psychiatrist was briefing his superiors of his concerns regarding Hunt was circa August 20, 1971—a week prior to the developing of Hunt's film of "intriguing" photographs of medical offices in southern California which impressed at least one CIA official as "casing" photographs.³⁵

With the aforementioned background, we are reminded that when the second profile on Ellsberg was completed (completion was delayed until November of 1971), Director Helms took pains to inform the White House that:

I do wish to underline the point that our involvement in this matter should not be revealed in any context, formal or informal (emphasis added).³⁶

In his recent testimony before this Committee, Director Helms stated that the above quoted language represented his concern only for the professional reputations of the CIA psychiatrists and *not* any concern over the possible illegality of the profile.³⁷ It should be noted, however, that in a memorandum from the psychiatrists' CIA supervisor to Helms in November of 1971, which accompanied the completed profile, their concern is expressed as follows:

[DMSS] and [Chief Psychiatrist] . . . confirmed that their worries *did not* . . . involve professional ethics or credibility. Instead, they are concerned lest the Agency's involvement . . . become known and particularly that it might come to light during any proceeding. * * * We will be guided by your determination after you have had an opportunity to read the new paper. (Emphasis supplied.)³⁸

The facts and circumstances related above, as derived from the recently curtailed investigation of this Committee, would appear to raise many unanswered questions as to the involvement of the CIA in matters outside its legislative parameters.

²⁸ Affidavit of [Deputy Director of Support, hereafter referred to as the DDS] and [Director of Medical Services Staff, hereinafter referred to as the DMSS] and [Chief of Psychiatric Staff on Medical Services Staff, hereinafter referred to as Chief Psychiatrist], Original CIA Materials, Volume I, Tab U; Volume II Tab D.

²⁹ *Id.*

³⁰ Executive Session Testimony of [Chief Psychiatrist], March 6, 1974 (transcription not presently available).

³¹ *Id.*, see also Colby letter refusing access, *infra*.

³² *Id.*

³³ *Id.*

³⁴ Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, *supra* note 3; Testimony of Richard Helms before the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 17, 1973, at 17.

³⁵ See Executive Session Testimony of [Chief, TSD], *supra* note 20.

³⁶ Memorandum from Richard Helms to David Young, November 9, 1971, Original CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab J.

³⁷ Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, *supra* note 3.

³⁸ Memorandum from [DDS], CIA Deputy Director of Support, to Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, November 9, 1971, Original CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab J.

ARTICLE BY WALTER PINCUS

Senator McGOVERN. I would like to ask you to respond to the Pincus article. It is a brief article. Could you supply the committee with a response because it is filled with rather serious reflections. I don't say that it represents my view because I don't know enough about the whole setup. I remember reading this article at the time and being struck with the fact it is a very damaging article. It is a flat assertion that you misled the committee in May of 1973.

(The information referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times, Oct. 2, 1974]

HELMS, THE C.I.A. AND PUBLIC TRUST

(By Walter Pincus)

WASHINGTON—The judgments that led to covert United States intervention in Chilean politics deserve to be criticized, but at least there the Central Intelligence Agency was within its legal authority under its charter. That was not the case with C.I.A. complicity in Watergate "extra-agency activities" and the subsequent cover-up.

The law barring the agency from undertaking domestic operations was clearly violated.

Moreover, when the former Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, gave misleading and inaccurate answers to questions posed to him during Congressional committee hearings about C.I.A. assistance to Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt while Mr. Hunt worked for the Nixon White House, Mr. Helms was apparently covering up information relevant to a criminal investigation then under way.

On May 21, 1973, with the Watergate cover-up beginning to crack, Mr. Helms was called back from Iran, where he was Ambassador, and questioned under oath by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The break-in at the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, by then had been uncovered, along with information that the C.I.A. had given equipment and aid to Mr. Hunt, who had directed the illegal entry.

Mr. Helms testified that he had never heard of Dr. Fielding until the psychiatrist's name had appeared in the newspapers. When asked about photographs that Mr. Hunt had taken of Dr. Fielding's office with a C.I.A. camera and that the agency had developed for Mr. Hunt, Mr. Helms swoffed, "I do not know what the contents of the film were in the latter part of August, 1971."

One Senator asked if anyone at the agency who had reviewed the film had thought Mr. Hunt might be contemplating a break-in. "I never heard anybody at the agency mention such a theory," Mr. Helms responded, adding later that "nobody had given us the slightest indication that anything underhanded was afoot."

Mr. Helms was asked why then had the C.I.A. halted its assistance to Mr. Hunt back on Aug. 27, 1971, the day the photographs had been returned to Mr. Hunt. Twice Mr. Helms said that it was solely because Mr. Hunt's requests had become "too extensive."

To support that, he recollects that Mr. Hunt had asked to have his former secretary brought back from Paris and that a covert New York telephone number and mailing address be established for him. Mr. Helms never mentioned the photos and what they appeared to show as the reason for the agency's having stopped its aid to Mr. Hunt.

Almost a year after the Helms testimony, the House Judiciary Committee released its material on the Ellsberg break-in and the C.I.A.'s role. Sworn statements from agency personnel along with other testimony indicate that Mr. Helms did not give the true story.

On Aug. 25, 1971, the new material shows, Mr. Hunt along with G. Gordon Liddy requested and received a high-speed camera, concealed in a tobacco pouch, designed for indoor clandestine photography.

A few days later, Mr. Hunt called long-distance and asked a C.I.A. technician to meet him at Dulles Airport, outside Washington, to pick up the camera and film and get it developed at the agency's laboratory.

The camera had been used by Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy to photograph Dr. Fielding's Beverly Hills office, inside and out, in order to plan the burglary.

When developed, but before they were delivered to Mr. Hunt at his White House office, the photos were reviewed by C.I.A. supervisory personnel. They showed a shot of a parking space with the name "Dr. Fielding" visible. They also showed shots of the doctor's office including his file cabinets and safe.

One C.I.A. official speculated at the time, according to the House committee's records, that these were "casing" photographs. Since such "bag jobs" were carried out by C.I.A. agents abroad, these officials were familiar with the need for the type of photos Hunt had taken.

The C.I.A. Deputy Director, Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., was informed since he had made the original arrangements to assist Mr. Hunt.

According to a Cushman aide, C.I.A. technical personnel had determined that the assistance already given to Mr. Hunt "appeared to involve the agency in clandestine operations," a finding confirmed, if not initiated, by the C.I.A. general counsel's office, which also had reviewed the pictures.

The decision was made to end further assistance to Mr. Hunt unless Mr. Helms ordered it continued.

Mr. Hunt was so informed when the photographs were delivered to him the afternoon of Aug. 27, 1971. That day, Mr. Cushman called John D. Ehrlichman and told him of the agency's decision. That such steps would have been taken without Mr. Helms's knowledge is unthinkable.

In 1971, Mr. Helms in a public speech asked the American people to recognize that in the case of autonomous, secret agencies such as the C.I.A. "the nation must to a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service."

Mr. Helms appears to have broken that faith and in a matter that involves corrupt activities at the highest Government level.

If he and his former agency are ever to again gain the public trust they need, they must make a full public accounting of past Watergate-related conduct. The Congressional committees with responsibility for overseeing the C.I.A. must now order that accounting to be made.

WASHINGTON, D.C., January 25, 1975.

Hon. JOHN SPARKMAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations;
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At the close of the hearing on January 22, 1975, at which I appeared as a witness before your Committee, Senator George McGovern requested that I provide your Committee with a note responding to certain charges made by Mr. Walter Pincus in an article in *The New York Times* of October 2, 1974, which is a part of the record of that hearing. In essence, Mr. Pincus claims I gave false testimony before your Committee in a hearing on May 21, 1973 regarding the Central Intelligence Agency's relations with Mr. Howard Hunt in 1971 and my knowledge thereof.

The implication of the Pincus article is that since photographs developed by the Agency for Mr. Hunt in August 1971 showed Dr. Fielding's name on the wall of a building, I must have had knowledge at that time of Hunt's intended break-in of Dr. Fielding's office. He states it was because of these photographs that I terminated further aid to Hunt and contends that in my testimony on May 21, 1973 I was apparently covering up information relevant to a criminal investigation then under way.

The facts are these. When an Agency employee developed some film for Mr. Hunt in August of 1971, I was not aware at that time that this had been done or that the Agency had copies. I had no idea of what Mr. Hunt's objective was except that he told General Robert Cushman that he wanted dis guise material "to elicit information from an individual." Since I did not know of the existence of the photographs, they did not have anything to do with cutting off aid to Hunt. What happened is that General Cushman informed me Hunt was making additional requests including special telephone service and the return of an Agency secretary from Paris to be loaned to the White House to work for him. I told General Cushman that no more assistance was to be given and that General Cushman should call Mr. Ehrlichman and have it stopped.

The officer who developed the pictures is reported to have discussed them with his immediate superiors at the time, but so far as I know they were not seen by senior officers in the Agency until about a year later when the Agency, as a result of the Watergate break-in, was trying to establish all the facts concerning its relations with Mr. Hunt. At that time, even though Dr. Fielding's name was discernible on a wall that was photographed, no one in the Agency who had seen the pictures had identified Dr. Fielding or was aware that his office had been broken into. Even in the latter part of 1972, when Mr. William Colby took copies of the photographs to the Department of Justice, neither he nor I knew why Hunt had taken them. Mr. Colby, as he has testified, thought they might have something to do with the Rand Corporation which, as it turned out, they did not.

All the material on this point supplied by the Agency to the various interested committees of Congress and the Special Prosecutor bear out what I have set forth above, I believe, and the bits of testimony or comment attributed by Mr. Pincus to Agency employees to not change the basic facts. I trust that this is an adequate answer to the assertions of Mr. Pincus and that it is responsive to Senator McGovern's request.

Respectfully,

RICHARD HELMS.

Secretary SYMINGTON. The conclusion one could draw is there are some people in this town who would like to wash out civilian control when it comes to what is necessary to do to protect the United States.

Senator McGOVERN. I am not one of those.

Senator SYMINGTON. I went through this business of Hunt when I was acting chairman of the Armed Services Committee. It is all on the record in Armed Services. I am confident Senator Stennis would be willing to have you read it.

COLSON ASSERTION CONCERNING MR. HUNT'S DELIVERIES TO CIA

Senator SCOTT. I want to put something in the record because I have now read the story I referred to in today's Star. Could I ask Mr. Helms, quoting from part of it, if he would comment briefly. That is all I have.

Colson told Senators Baker and Weicker that Hunt delivered sealed envelopes and packages to Richard Ober, a CIA counterintelligence officer, who forwarded them to the CIA Director at that time, Richard Helms, the sources said last night. Colson said he suspected that the envelope contained tapes and other materials relating to operations of the White House plumbers, the sources said. Both sources emphasized that Senators Baker and Weicker, both of whom served on the Watergate Committee, had not obtained independent confirmation of Colson's assertion.

It is really a repetition of what I asked you.

Ambassador HELMS. I do not recall any such thing.

Senator SCOTT. May I ask unanimous consent that be put in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. That will be put in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

[From the Washington Star-News, Jan. 22, 1975]

COLSON HITS CIA ON DATE

Former White House counsel Charles W. Colson has stated that convicted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt frequently passed information to the Central Intelligence Agency after the time the agency says it severed relations with Hunt, two sources have said.

Colson told Sens. Howard H. Baker Jr., R-Tenn., and Lowell P. Weicker, R-Conn., that Hunt delivered sealed envelopes and packages to Richard Ober, a CIA counterintelligence officer, who forwarded them to the CIA's director at that time, Richard Helms, the sources said last night.

Colson said he suspected that the envelopes contained tapes and other material relating to operations of the White House plumbers unit, the sources said.

Both sources emphasized that Baker and Weicker, both of whom served on the Senate Watergate committee, had not obtained independent confirmation of Colson's assertions.

Spokesmen for the two senators confirmed last night that they had met with Colson on Monday at their request. Colson was brought from Ft. Holabird, Md., to the federal courthouse in Alexandria for the meeting.

Colson is serving one to three years in prison after pleading guilty to one count of obstruction of justice for attempting to defame Pentagon Papers defendant Daniel Ellsberg.

Colson said Hunt continued to pass the material to Ober until late May 1972. The CIA has said it stopped providing Hunt aid for his projects on the plumbers unit Aug. 27, 1971.

But the CIA has acknowledged providing a psychological assessment of Ellsberg as late as November 1971. The agency maintained it was unaware of Hunt's role in requesting the profile.

Ober has been named by the New York Times as manager of a massive, illegal domestic spying operation undertaken by CIA during the Nixon administration.

SANITIZATION AND RELEASE OF RECORD

Senator CASE. Before we break up, we have the usual problem, unless I am surprised, of people outside from the press who would like to catch us on the way out. You and I informally discussed the possibility of having them come in and have the chairman state that the record will be sanitized and then released in due course. For my part that is enough.

Senator SYMINGTON. I so move, Mr. Chairman.

ARTICLE CONCERNING MR. COLSON

May I say I just went upstairs and somebody gave me the paper. I read it and showed it to Senator Scott and suggested it be in the record. He said he planned, after I showed it to him, to put it in the record.

Senator SCOTT. That is right, and I thank the Senator. I think it should be in there.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen; Thank you, Mr. Helms.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
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CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Remarks: Attached for your information is a copy of the testimony of Ambassador Helms before the Foreign Relations Committee on the 22nd of January as it was subsequently sanitized and released. FYI Ambassador Helms consulted with Larry Houston and Tom Karamessines on the sanitization and although we were not consulted by the Committee, the Director asked Pat Holt to delete the references to individuals in connection with the Chile testimony.			
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